Abstract. While expensive cryptographically verifiable computation aims at defeating malicious agents, many civil purposes of outsourced computation tolerate a weaker notion of security, i.e., "lazy-but-honest" contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards, punishments, auditing rate, and "redundancy". Our contracts provably minimize the expense of the outsourcer (principal) while guaranteeing correct computation. Furthermore, we incorporate practical restrictions of the maximum enforceable fine, limited and/or costly auditing, and bounded budget of the outsourcer. By examining the optimal contracts, we provide insights on how resources should be utilized when auditing capacity and enforceability are limited. Finally, we present a light-weight cryptographic implementation of the contracts to mitigate the double moral hazard problem between the principal and the agents.
Introduction
The idea of outsourcing complex computation tasks has been proposed and implemented in a variety of applications. Research projects involving complex analysis on a huge multitude of data have utilized parallel processing of their computations on the processors of millions of volunteering Internet users. These include search for extra-terrestrial life (SETI@Home), investigation of protein folding and computational drug design (Folding@Home and Rosetta@home). Businesses from different sections including finance, energy infrastructure, mining and commodities transport, technology and innovation [7] have also realized the benefits of outsourcing their data and computation, and "moving to the cloud". The cloud, as a dedicated infrastructure with specialized man-force and powerful computing capabilities, along with the ability to pool demands from different clients and dynamic assignment of the resources can reduce the cost of computation. Meanwhile, the outsourcer is also relieved from maintaining a dedicated computing infrastructure and in addition, has the total flexibility of pay-per-use paradigm, to flex-on or to flex-off services effortlessly [7] . This growing trend has made possible small virtualised computers and smart devices with powerful computational power, applicable to critical mission scenarios and everyday use.
The full version of this paper with formal proofs for all the propositions is accessible via https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/374.pdf.
In all of these scenarios, there is a concern for the outsourcer (client) about the correctness of the returned results. The provider of computation services (the servers) have an economic incentive to return guessed results as opposed to performing the computation completely and honestly, and thereby save on the computation work. Hence, to make this paradigm viable and guarantee soundness of the results, there must be an auditing mechanism in place. The auditing, however, is not free: it either creates computational overhead for the client, the server, or both. The auditing can be done by the outsourcer itself or through a trusted third party for a fee, say, through re-computation. Alternatively, a redundancy scheme can be employed in which the same job is outsourced to multiple servers and the results are checked against each other.
Irrespective of the auditing mechanism, the outsourcer can set an extremely large fine for detected wrong results, and make cheating theoretically impossible even for the lowest probability of cheat detection. However, in practice, an extremely large fine is a non-credible threat. A more reasonable assumption is a cap on the maximum enforceable fine, with the special interesting case where the cap is zero. In this paper we provide a concrete and general approach based on Principal-Agent modelling from game theory to optimal contract designs for outsourcing from the client (principal) to the servers (agents). Specifically, we assume a general maximum enforceable fine, maximum budget, and costly and/or limited auditing rate. We formulate the utilities of both the principal and the agents, as well as essential constraints that guarantee honest computation (incentive compatibility) along with their acceptance of the offer (participation). This allows us to systematically compute the optimal contract such that the principal's expense is minimized. Our work hence potentially provides a benchmark enabling comparison among different deployments of outsourcing.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review previous results and describe our contributions. This is followed by a detailed motivation of our contract model in Section 3, along with descriptions of important constraints that make the problem non-trivial. In Section 4, we compute optimal contracts involving only one agent, and explore related improvements. In Section 5, we allow the principal to also potentially outsource the same task to multiple noncolluding agents as an alternative means of auditing and develop optimal hybrid contracts. We further establish the global optimality of our hybrid two-agent contracts among all possible contracts involving any number of non-colluding agents with respect to the notion of Nash Equilibria. In Section 6, we comment on cryptographic implementation of our contracts, i.e., how to enforce the terms and policies in an automated way. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper with a summary of the results and remark on some potential future directions.
Related Work
A line of research is focused on designing reliable verification techniques for outsourcing of special-purpose computations. For instance, [17] investigates outsourcing of linear optimizations. Other notable examples are queries on outsourced databases, including typical queries [1, 5] and aggregation [18] . Their main
